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Abstract
Confidential Content-Based Publish/Subscribe (C-
CBPS) is an interaction (pub/sub) model that allows
parties to exchange data while still protecting their
security and privacy interests. In this paper we advance
the state of the art in C-CBPS by showing how all
predicate circuits in NC1 (logarithmic-depth, bounded
fan-in) can be securely computed by a broker while
guaranteeing perfect information-theoretic security.
Previous work could handle only strictly shallower
circuits (e.g. those with depth O(
√
lgn)1)[?, ?]. We
present three protocols – UGP-Match, FSGP-Match and
OFSGP-Match – all three are based on (2-decomposable
randomized encodings of) group programs and handle
circuits in NC1. UGP-Match is conceptually simple
and has a clean proof of correctness but it is inefficient
and impractical. FSGP-Match uses a “fixed structure”
trick to achieve efficiency and scalability. And, finally,
OFSGP-Match uses hand-optimized group programs
to wring greater efficiencies. We complete our investi-
gation with an experimental evaluation of a prototype
implementation.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Pub/sub systems are an efficient means of routing rele-
vant information from publishers or content generators
to subscribers or consumers. The efficiency of pub/sub
models comes from the fact that subscribers typically re-
ceive only a subset of the total messages published. The
process of selecting messages for reception and process-
ing is called filtering. There are two common forms of
1We use lg to denote log2.
filtering: topic-based2 and content-based. In this paper
we focus on Content-Based Publish/Subscribe systems
(CBPS) where messages are only delivered to a sub-
scriber if the attributes or metadata of those messages
match predicates defined by the subscriber. The sub-
scriber is responsible for specifying his preferences as
a predicate over the attributes of the content produced by
the publisher. For the purposes of this paper we will as-
sume that the predicate is expressed as a circuit and we
will use the terms predicate and circuit interchangeably.
There is a third party, the broker, who is responsible for
matching the subscriber’s predicate to the metadata pro-
duced by the publisher and, in case of a match, forward-
ing the associated data to the subscriber, see Figure 1 for
the basic interaction pattern (ignore the encryptions for
now). The loose coupling between subscribers and pub-
lishers enabled by the broker allows for greater scalabil-
ity. CBPS is an incredibly useful means of disseminating
information and can be viewed as an abstraction for a
variety of different applications ranging from forward-
ing of e-mail to query/response systems built on top of
databases.
Scalability of CBPS systems and the distributed co-
ordination of a mesh of brokers are natural concerns.
But, in recent times, with the proliferation of online so-
cial networks and new forms of social media an even
more pressing concern has come into focus, namely con-
fidentiality. Publisher confidentiality refers to the no-
tion that the publisher would like to keep his content
secure from the broker, e.g., the stock exchange would
like to keep ticker/price information private to prevent
2In a topic-based system, messages are published to “topics” or
named logical channels. Subscribers in a topic-based system will re-
ceive all messages published to the topics to which they subscribe, and
all subscribers to a topic will receive the same messages. The publisher
is responsible for defining the classes of messages to which subscribers
can subscribe.
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Figure 1: The C-CBPS interaction model
reselling. Subscriber confidentiality is the notion that
subscribers would like to keep their preferences private,
e.g. a hedge fund would not wish to reveal their inter-
est in a particular stock. The widespread development of
web and mobile apps has created a proliferation of third-
parties involved in the business of handling user prefer-
ences and routing content, e.g. iPhone and Android apps,
Facebook and Twitter apps. But even in earlier times,
there has always been the need for preserving the pri-
vacy of both the publisher and the subscriber. For ex-
ample, a database server must not learn what informa-
tion was requested by a client, and yet have the assur-
ance that the client was authorized to have the informa-
tion that was sent; a mail relay must be able to forward
the relevant emails without learning the contents of the
email or the subscribers of a mail-list. This motivates the
need for Confidential Content-Based Publish/Subscribe
(C-CBPS) schemes. See Figure 1 (note that the pub-
lisher’s metadata and the subscriber’s predicate are en-
crypted).
1.2 Our Results
Until recently, the problem of securing the privacy of
the publishers and subscribers had seemed to be a for-
bidding task. Practical C-CBPS systems were able only
to handle the confidentiality of exact matches and some
minor variants [?]. Sophisticated schemes that handle
more expressive subscriber predicates were too slow to
use in practice. In general, the schemes were either prac-
tical or expressive but not both. However, the recent
and dramatic breakthrough [?] in fully homomorphic en-
cryption (FHE)3 [?] has spurred a flurry of activity in
this space. FHE has improved the efficiency of Secure
Multiparty Computation (SMC) [?] schemes of which C-
CBPS is a special case. This is an asymptotic and si-
multaneous improvement in communication and compu-
tational overheads but the transformation to obtain a C-
CBPS scheme is not trivial and does incur some loss in
efficiency. Though substantial progress is being made in
improving the speed of FHE schemes, it is still the case
today that fast and practical realizations are a ways off.
Motivated by FHE we went back and took a second look
at a scheme that is nearly two decades old [?]. Reusing
the technology of group programs [?] in the context of
decomposable randomized encodings [?] we are able not
only to obtain a theoretical advance on the state of the
art, but we have in fact, produced a protocol that is fast
and practical. Furthermore, our main results guarantee
security in the unconditional information-theoretic set-
ting whereas the FHE advance is in the computational
setting.
We have two main contributions in this paper.
• We present an information-theoretically secure pro-
tocol, UGP-Match employing universal group pro-
grams to match any predicate in NC1. UGP-Match
demonstrates the theoretical possibility of attaining
NC1 but is not practical.
• We then show how a “fixed structure” trick gets us
substantially closer to creating a practical and real-
world protocol, FSGP-Match, to achieve fast and
secure matching of any predicate in NC1. FSGP-
Match is identical to UGP-Match in security guar-
antees but is much faster. We then squeeze out
additional efficiency using hand optimized group
programs to achieve our fastest protocol, OFSGP-
Match, which is closer to being practical.
We have built prototypes of all three protocols and cre-
ated an implementation of a real-world pub-sub system.
We present the results of our evaluation on a testbed.
The good news is that our schemes provide us with a
level of expressivity (NC1) that was previously unattain-
able and in the strongest model of security (information-
theoretic). The bad news is that there is still a gap to
be overcome to make these protocols truly practical -
we show in Section 5 that if a subscriber and publisher
wish to compute a secure match based on, say, the Ham-
ming distance (chosen as a representative function of in-
3FHE is an encryption scheme that allows a third party to take en-
cryptions E(a) and E(b) of two bits, a and b, and obtain from them
encryptions of E(a¯), E(b¯), E(a)∨E(b), and E(a)∧E(b), without ac-
cess to the private key used for encryption.
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terest) between their respective (private) bit-vectors then
on today’s laptops one cannot go above length 16 for
the bit-vectors and still compute the match under 1s.
Further, such single message protocols that achieve per-
fect information theoretic security in the context of pub-
lish/subscribe incur a tremendous overhead: for every
published notification, the publisher and all subscribers
need to prepare fresh messages to send to the broker.
The above C-CBPS protocols can be converted to
use shared seeds and pseudorandom generators (PSRGs)
rather than shared randomness. The resulting protocols
are easily seen to be secure in the computational setting
based on the unpredictability of the PSRGs.
The focus of this paper is on achieving a secure match
algorithm that is scalable. Therefore we concentrated on
bounded depth predicates, i.e. predicates in NC1. But we
also have additional asymptotic and complexity-theoretic
improvements which are not practical. For completeness
we mention them here but we do not present the proofs or
constructions in this paper. One, using universal branch-
ing programs we can give an information-theoretically
secure (C-CBPS) protocol for matching any predicate in
NL(nondeterministic logspace). Second, using random-
ized encodings we can give a computationally secure (C-
CBPS) protocol to match any predicate in P (polynomial
time).
1.3 Related Work
Several practical CBPS systems have been built for sup-
porting a variety of distributed applications. Siena [?]
is one of the most well known; Gryphon [?] and Scribe
[?] are others. Work on the security aspects, namely C-
CBPS in the systems community is less than a decade
old. A C-CBPS system supporting only equality matches
is presented in [?] and a system supporting extensions to
inequality and range matches is presented in [?]. Both
these systems are in the setting of computational secu-
rity. However, neither of these systems satisfy our con-
fidentiality model since they allow the broker to see that
the encrypted predicates from two different subscribers
are identical.
As mentioned earlier, C-CBPS is a special case of
SMC and there is a large and comprehensive literature
on SMC in the cryptographic community [?, ?, ?]. The
special case of 2-party SMC, known as Secure Function
Evaluation (SFE), is an important subcase [?], that is
(different from but) closely related to the C-CBPS model.
Research in SMC started nearly 3 decades ago with the
path-breaking work of Yao, [?], and is broadly divided
into two classes of protocols - those that are computa-
tionally secure (i.e. conditioned on certain complexity-
theoretic assumptions) and those that are information-
theoretically (or unconditionally) secure.
In the computational setting the initial work of Yao
[?] and Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [?] has led to a
large body of work [?, ?, ?]. In the past decade a number
of practical schemes based on garbled circuits and oblivi-
ous transfer have emerged for the honest-but-curious ad-
versarial model: Fairplay [?], Tasty [?] and VMCrypt
[?]. But these schemes are for SMC and are inefficient
and impractical when restricted to the special case of C-
CBPS because of the need to handle universal circuits
[?]. Again, as mentioned before, the recent breakthrough
in FHE [?] holds out hope for more efficient protocols for
SMC but practical protocols are yet to be realized.
On the information-theoretic front the works of
BenOr, Goldwasser and Wigderson [?] and Chaum,
Cre´peau and Da˚mgard [?] proved completeness results
for SMC. There have been additional improvements [?]
using the subsequently developed notion of randomized
encodings [?, ?]. The seminal work of Feige, Kilian
and Naor [?], which lays the groundwork of this paper,
considered an interaction model, the FKN model (de-
tailed in Definition 11, SubSection 2.3) that is closely
related to, but different from the C-CBPS model. For
the FKN model [?] demonstrated protocols for predi-
cates in NC1 and also in NL. Though NC1 ⊆ NL [?, ?]
the NC1 protocol is the one we build on in this paper
to achieve scalable and secure matching in the C-CBPS
model.
The protocol of Feige, Kilian and Naor [?] in the FKN
model is rendered impractical when used for the case of
C-CBPS because of the need (for the broker) to com-
pute universal circuits [?]. We explain this briefly: the
FKN model involves the broker computing a known pub-
lic function f (P,m) given the encrypted version of m,
data from the publisher, and P, data from the subscriber.
C-CBPS is the special case where f (P,m) =P(m), i.e.,
P is a predicate (or the encoding of one) and f is a uni-
versal function that simulates P on m. The need for
universal circuits poses a barrier - both theoretical and
practical. Though, some optimizations for universal cir-
cuits have been discovered [?], the current state of the art
is that the subscriber is restricted to predicates of strictly
sublogarithmic depth [?, ?] - more specifically, the pred-
icate is constrained by the condition d ∗ (lgs) = O(lgn)
where d is the depth and s the size of the (bounded fanin)
subscriber predicate. In general, since s can be as large
as 2d this means that d is restricted to be O(
√
lgn). In
this paper we show how to bypass the need for a univer-
sal circuit and achieve d = Ω(lgn) i.e. we can match
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Figure 2: Adversarial model
any NC1 predicate in the C-CBPS interaction model.
We show how carefully constructed 2-decomposable ran-
domized encodings [?, ?, ?] can be used to securely
and efficiently simulate arbitrary circuits of logarithmic
depth.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Adversarial Model
In our C-CBPS model there are 3 parties – the broker,
the publisher and the subscriber. The publisher and sub-
scriber have a shared random string r known only to the
two of them. Meta-data m is private to the publisher and
predicate P is private to the subscriber. The publisher
and subscriber each have a separate and private chan-
nel to the broker. They are to each send a single mes-
sage to the broker from which the broker should be able
to correctly, securely and efficiently compute the value
of P(m) but learn absolutely nothing else. We work in
the information-theoretic security model where we don’t
make any constraining assumptions on the computational
resources available to the broker. However, the publisher
and subscriber are restricted to be polynomial-time prob-
abilistic Turing machines. In fact, given the shared ran-
domness they are deterministic polynomial-time Turing
machines. And in keeping with Kerckhoffs’s principle
[?] it is assumed that the broker knows the details of the
algorithm/protocol being used, i.e., it knows everything
except forP, m and r. This adversarial model is captured
in Figure 2
2.2 Measure
We denote the length of the meta-data m as n = |m|. In
the case of the predicate P the relevant measure is the
depth and we parameterize it as a multiple of lgn, to be
precise we denote the depth of P by κ lgn where n is
the parameter that asymptotically goes to infinity while
κ is a constant. The reason for parameterizing in this
way is that the obvious parameterization of the size of
P, in terms of the number of gates, is not relevant as it
is still an open problem to handle arbitrary polynomial-
sized predicate circuits in the information theoretic set-
ting. We remind the reader that the defining contribution
of this paper is showing how to handle circuits in NC1,
i.e. logarithmic-depth circuits.
As we will see from the subsequent sections of this
paper, the broker will get two (sub)sequences of group
elements each from the publisher and subscriber that he
will interlace and multiply together to obtain P(m). We
denote by L the length of the sequence that the broker
composes from the shares he receives. The efficiency
question, thus, becomes given an n and a κ what is the
smallest L that a given protocol achieves. In what fol-
lows we will see that, in the case of the protocol based on
Valiant’s universal circuit [?], L = nΩ(κ lgn) which is non-
polynomial. In general the goal of this paper is to achieve
L which will be a polynomial in n but the lower the de-
gree of the polynomial the more efficient the protocol.
We will show that UGP-Match achieves L = n12κ+1 lgn.
With FSGP-Match we bring this down to L = 4n2κ+2)
and then finally with OFGSP-Match we bring it down to
L = 2n2κ+1. We point out that these upper bounds are ex-
act, i.e. we can analyze these constructions down to the
exact constant and so do not need to employ the big-oh
notation. For convenience we present our results in the
form of a table.
Protocol Complexity(L) In words
Universal Circuit nΩ(κ lgn) (super-poly-time)
UGP-Match O˜(n20κ+2) (poly-time)
FSGP-Match 4n2κ+2 ”
OFSGP-Match 2n2κ+1 ”
Table 1: This table shows the complexity of the various
protocols.
2.3 Terminology and Propositions
We set up some terminology and definitions for use in
the rest of the paper. We also state and/or prove some
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basic propositions that will set the ground for the results
to come later.
For the sake of completeness we define the C-CBPS
model formally.
Definition 1 (C-CBPS). The 3 parties in the C-CBPS
model and their states of knowledge are captured in Fig-
ure 2. There is a single round of communication where
the publisher and subscriber each send a private mes-
sage (Er(m) and Er(P), respectively) to the broker who
is then able to efficiently compute P(m) such that
Correctness ∀m,P, and r, given the encrypted messages
Er(m),Er(P) the broker computes P(m) correctly all
the time.
Security ∀m,P, and r, given the encrypted messages
Er(m),Er(P) the broker learns nothing whatsoever
about m,P (other than the value of P(m)).
We will use the language of multiplicative groups. For
our purposes a group is a just a set of elements with a
binary operation and inverses. We let G denote a generic
multiplicative group. We will need G to be an unsolvable
group (for reasons to be explained later) and so we can
take it to be S5 the symmetric group of permutations of a
5-element set. By default we will use the standard and
implicit one-line notation derived from Cauchy’s two-
line notation [?] to represent a permutation.
Definition 2 (Cycle). A permutation g ∈ S5 is said to be
a cycle if its graph consists of exactly one cycle of length
5. For example, (53412) is a cycle because its graph is
the cycle 1→ 5→ 2→ 3→ 4→ 1.
When we use the product-of-cycles notation then we
will explicitly have a subscript “cycle” at the end. For
example (24513) = (124)(35)cycle represents the per-
mutation 1→ 2,2→ 4,3→ 5,4→ 1,5→ 3 with graph
1→ 2→ 4→ 1,3→ 5→ 3.
For the rest of this paper we will use α ∈ S5 to denote
the cycle (23451). And, the identity in the group is 1S5 =
(12345).
Our protocols will involve group programs which in
turn involve sequences of group elements and their prod-
ucts. This motivates the following:
Definition 3 (Value of a sequence). Given a sequence
S of group elements g1, g2, . . ., gL, the value of the se-
quence Value(S) is defined to be the product of the se-
quence elements in order, i.e.
Value(S) =
L
∏
i=1
gi = g1g2 . . .gL.
Definition 4 (Blinding). Given a sequence S of group
elements g1, g2, . . ., gL, BS (S) is used to denote the
distribution over sequences of the form
g1 · r1,r−11 ·g2 · r2, . . . ,r−1L ·gL,
generated by choosing each ri,∀i1 ≤ i ≤ L − 1 uni-
formly and independently from G. We overload the term
BS (S) to also refer to a specific sequence selected
according to the distribution BS (S) and the context
should be sufficient to resolve any ambiguity. The ri
are referred to as blinders and blinding S refers to the
act of selecting a sequence according to the distribution
BS (S).
Lemma 5 (The Blinding Lemma). Given a sequence
of group elements, S, of length L, the blinded sequence
BS (S) has the following two properties:
Preserves value: Value(BS (S)) =Value(S)
Uniform distribution: BS (S) is uniformly distributed
over the space of all sequences of group elements of
length L with the same value, i.e. for any sequence
S′ = g′1,g
′
2 . . .g
′
L we have that
Pr(BS (S) = S′|Value(S′) = Value(S)) = 1|G|L−1
where the probability is measured over the random
choices of the blinders.
Proof. It is easy to see that blinding preserves the value
of the sequence because the blinders, the ri, cancel out
when the elements of the blinded sequence are multiplied
together.
Now, we need to show the uniform distribution prop-
erty. First, observe that the space of all sequences S′
such that Value(S) = Value(S′) has size exactly |G|L−1.
This is because we can pick the first L− 1 elements,
g′1,g
′
2, . . . ,g
′
L−1 of S
′ arbitrarily from the group (in |G|L−1
ways) but having done that then (because these elements
are chosen from a group) there is exactly one value for
the n-th element gL namely g−1L−1 ·g−1L−2 · . . . ·g−11 ·Value(S)
such that Value(S′) = Value(S).
Hence, to compute Pr(BS (S) = S′) we just need to
compute the probability that the first L− 1 elements of
the two sequences (BS (S) and S′) match because the
condition, that Value(S′) = Value(S) along with the al-
ready proven fact that Value(BS (S)) = Value(S′) im-
plies that the L-th elements must automatically match if
the first L−1 match.
Let BS (S) = b1,b2, . . . ,bL. Then what we have ar-
5
gued is that
Pr((b1 = s′1)∧ (b2 = s′2)∧·· ·∧ (bL = s′L)|(Value(S′) = Value(S)))
= Pr((b1 = s′1)∧ (b2 = s′2)∧·· ·∧ (bL−1 = s′L−1)|(bL = s′L))
= Pr((b1 = s′1)∧ (b2 = s′2)∧·· ·∧ (bL−1 = s′L−1))
= Pr(b1 = s′1)×Pr((b2 = s′2)|(b1 = s′1))
×Pr((b3 = s′3)|(b1 = s′1)∧ (b2 = s′2))
× . . .
×Pr((bn−1 = s′n−1)|(b1 = s′1)∧ (b2 = s′2)∧ . . .
. . .∧ (bL−1 = s′L−1))
But, by the definition of blinding, the above is
Pr(r1 = s−11 · s′1)×Pr(r2 = s−12 · s−11 · s′1 · s′2)
×·· ·×Pr(rL−1 =
L−1
∏
i=1
s−1i
L−1
∏
i=
s′i)
==
1
|G| ×
1
|G| × · · ·×
1
|G|
=
1
|G|L−1 .
But this means that BS (S) is uniformly distributed
over the space of all sequences of group elements with
the same value since the space of all such sequences is of
size exactly |G|L−1, as has been argued earlier.
The following definition, of a group program, is cen-
tral to this paper and is presented in visual form in Figure
3.
Definition 6 (Group Program). Let α be an element of
S5. A group program of length L is (g01, . . ., g
0
L), (g
1
1,
. . . ,g1L), (k1, . . ., kL) where for any i, j: g
j
i ∈ S5 and
ki ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. We say that this program α-computes
f : {0,1}n→{0,1} if ∀x,
f (x) = 1⇒
`
∏
i=1
g
xki
i = α
f (x) = 0⇒
`
∏
i=1
g
xki
i = 1S5 ;
which we can write compactly as ∀x : ∏`i=1 g
xki
i = α
f (x).
We will consider predicates represented as n-input,
single output (bounded fan-in) circuits of AND(∧ two-
input), OR(∨ two-input) and NOT(¬ single input) gates.
Our definition of the depth of a circuit is slightly non-
standard in that we ignore NOT(¬) gates. This is because
gi1 
gi0 
xki 
Group Program Element Selects: 
    gi1 if bit xki = 1 
    gi0 if bit xki = 0 
g11 
g10 
xk1=1 
Group Program evaluates to: 
 α  if  f (x1, x2, …xn ) = 1 
 I   if  f (x1, x2, …xn ) = 0 
g21 
g20 
xk2=0 
gL1 
gL0 
xkL=1 
g31 
g30 
xk3=0 α = (2 3 4 5 1) 
I = (1 2 3 4 5) 
Group Program α-computing f (x1, x2, …xn )  
Figure 3: The form of a Group Program
of the Barrington Transform (to be elaborated below)
which transforms a circuit into a group progam whose
length depends only on the depth of the circuit in terms
of AND(∧) and OR(∨) gates.
Definition 7 (Depth of a Circuit). The depth of a circuit
is defined to be the number of AND and OR gates in the
longest path from an input to the output. (NOT gates do
not count towards depth).
In his seminal paper [?], on the way to showing that
NC1 is computable by fixed-width branching programs,
Barrington showed that any logarithmic-depth circuit can
be transformed into a polynomial-length group program
- a transformation we term the Barrington Transform.
Theorem 8 (Barrington Transform). Any circuit of depth
d can be transformed into a group program of length 4d
that α-computes the same function as the circuit.
For the sake of completeness we present the proof in
Appendix A.1. The proof, presented as a series of lem-
mas, details the Barrington Transform showing how to
transform a circuit into a group program. This treatment
is directly based on [?].
It follows from Theorem 8 that the Barrington Trans-
form transforms any n-input single output circuit of
depth κ lgn into a group program of length n2κ where
κ is a constant.
We will be using an extension of the notion of random-
ized encodings [?, ?, ?] that played a significant role in
the breakthrough showing the feasibility of cryptography
in NC0 [?]. First, we give the definition of randomized
encodings.
Definition 9 (Randomized encoding). A function f (x) is
said to have a randomized encoding fˆ (x,r), where r is a
6
random string, if there exist two efficiently computable
(deterministic, polynomial-time) algorithms REC and
SIM such that
Correctness ∀x,r, given fˆ (x,r) REC recovers f (x), i.e.
REC( fˆ (x,r)) = f (x) .
Security ∀x, given x and r′ (random coins), SIM pro-
duces a distribution identical to fˆ (x,r), i.e., the distribu-
tion of SIM(x,r′) is identical to the distribution of fˆ (x,r).
The above definition will make it easier to compre-
hend the definition of a 2-decomposable randomized en-
coding. We believe that, though natural in the context of
2-party secure computation, this is the first time this defi-
nition is appearing explicitly in the literature. A stronger
definition of decomposable randomized encodings has
appeared before [?, ?] and the notion of 2-decomposable
randomized encodings is implicit in prior works, includ-
ing [?].
Definition 10 (2-decomposable Randomized encoding).
A function f (x,y) is said to have a 2-decomposable
randomized encoding 〈 fˆ1(x,r), fˆ2(y,r)〉, where r is a
(shared) random string, if there exist two efficiently
computable (deterministic, polynomial-time) algorithms
REC and SIM such that
Correctness ∀x,y,r, given 〈 fˆ1(x,r), fˆ2(y,r)〉 REC recov-
ers f (x,y), i.e., REC(〈 fˆ1(x,r), fˆ2(y,r)〉) = f (x,y).
Security ∀x,y, given x,y and r′ (random coins), SIM pro-
duces a distribution identical to 〈 fˆ1(x,r), fˆ2(y,r)〉, i.e.,
the distribution of SIM(x,y,r′) is identical to the distri-
bution of 〈 fˆ1(x,r), fˆ2(y,r)〉.
The schemes presented in this paper rely crucially on
the model and construction presented in [?]. We define
the FKN model and show how protocols for it are essen-
tially equivalent to 2-decomposable randomized encod-
ings.
Definition 11 (FKN model). The 3 parties in the FKN
model and their states of knowledge are captured in Fig-
ure 4. There is a single round of communication where
Alice and Bob each send a private message (Er(x) and
Er(y), respectively) to Carol who is then able to effi-
ciently compute the publicly known function f (x,y) such
that
Correctness ∀x,y, and r, given the encrypted messages
Er(x),Er(y) Carol computes f (x,y) correctly all the
time.
Security ∀x,y, and r, given the encrypted messages
Er(x),Er(y) Carol learns nothing whatsoever about x,y
(other than the value of f (x,y)).
      Alice 
         knows x 
does not learn y 
          or f(x,y) 
      Bob 
         knows y 
    does not learn x 
           or f(x,y) 
Carol 
Encrypted data 
Er(x) 
Encrypted data 
Er(y) 
 learns only f(x,y) 
    does not learn 
           x or y 
f is publicly known 
 
Shared randomness 
r 
Figure 4: FKN model
Lemma 12 (Equivalence of FKN and 2-decomposable
randomized encoding). There is a 1-1 isomorphism be-
tween protocols for the FKN model and 2-decomposable
randomized encodings.
Proof. We will first see that a 2-decomposable random-
ized encoding of the function f (x,y) gives rise to a pro-
tocol for the FKN model. Let Alice compute and send
fˆ1(x,r) to Carol while Bob computes and send fˆ2(y,r)
to Carol. From the Correctness property it follows that
Carol can run REC(〈 fˆ1(x,r), fˆ2(y,r)〉) to compute f (x,y)
correctly all the time. And from the Security property we
get that Carol learns nothing but the value f (x,y).
Similarly, given a protocol for the FKN model that
computes the publicly known function f (x,y) it is easy
to see that the Correctness and Security properties carry
over by setting Er(x) = fˆ1(x,r) and Er(y) = fˆ2(x,r).
We present the definition of a Universal Function be-
low.
Definition 13 (Universal Function). A Universal Func-
tionU F has two inputs x and y where y is the encoding
of a function for which x is a suitable input. The output
of U F (x,y) is defined to be y(x).
One can similarly define Universal Circuits which are
similar to Universal Functions except that they work with
encoding of circuits and simulate circuits.
Definition 14 (Universal Circuit). A Universal Circuit
U C has two inputs x and y where y is the encoding of
a circuit for which x is a suitable input. The output of
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Figure 5: The form of a (α,1)-preserving Group Pro-
gram
U C (x,y) is defined to be y(x), in other words the Uni-
versal Circuit outputs the result obtained from simulating
function y on input x. (Universal Circuits are the circuit
equivalent of Universal Turing Machines).
The central idea of this paper is to bypass Universal
Circuits so we will not be utilizing this definition except
to explain (in Section 3) how it is that we pick up effi-
ciency gains by avoiding them.
One can naturally apply the notion of a 2-
decomposable randomized encoding to a universal func-
tion f (x,y) = y(x).
And analogous to the correspondence expressed in
Lemma 12 we have the following correspondence.
Lemma 15 (Equivalence of C-CBPS and 2-decompos-
able randomized encoding of universal functions). There
is a 1-1 isomorphism between protocols for the C-CBPS
model and 2-decomposable randomized encodings of
universal functions.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 12
and so we provide only the key aspects of the corre-
spondence as the details are straightforward. x,y corre-
spond to m,P respectively. fˆ1(x,r), fˆ2(y,r) correspond
to Er(m),Er(P) respectively. And the Correctness and
Security properties carry over in a direct way.
We now present some definitions that clarify the “fixed
structure” trick alluded to earlier, and how it relates to 2-
decomposable randomized encodings of universal func-
tions. The following definition of a (α,1)-preserving
group program is presented in visual form in Figure 5.
Definition 16 ((α,1)-preserving group programs).
An (α,1)-preserving group program of length L is
(g1,g2, . . . ,gL+1), (k1,k2, . . . ,kL) where for any i: gi ∈ S5
and ki ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. We say that this (α,1)-preserving
group program α-computes f : {0,1}n→{0,1} if ∀x,
f (x) = 1⇒ (
`
∏
i=1
gi ·αxki )gL+1 = α
f (x) = 0⇒ (
`
∏
i=1
gi ·αxki )gL+1 = 1S5 ;
which we can write compactly as ∀x : (∏`i=1 gi ·
αxki )gL+1 = α f (x).
Definition 17 (Index sequence of an (α,1)-preserving
group program). Given (g1,g2, . . . ,gL+1),
(k1,k2, . . . ,kL), an (α,1)-preserving group program
of length L, its index sequence is (k1,k2, . . . ,kL).
Analogous to Theorem 8 we have
Theorem 18 ((α,1)-preserving Barrington Transform).
Any circuit of depth d can be transformed into a (α,1)-
preserving group program of length 4d that α-computes
the same function as the circuit.
For the sake of completeness we present the proof in
Appendix A.2.
The definition of a fixed structure group program given
below is crucial to improving the efficiency of the ideas
presented in this paper and making them practical.
Definition 19 (Fixed structure group program). If a class
of functions (say, the class of n-input single output func-
tions computable by circuits of depth κ lgn) can all be
transformed into (α,1)-preserving group programs with
the exact same index sequence (and hence the exact same
length) then the resulting class of group programs is said
to have a fixed structure. In a slight abuse of language
we refer to the class itself as a fixed structure group pro-
gram.
3 Overview
Before explaining the bottleneck that this paper has over-
come we first briefly sketch the protocol for the FKN
model presented in [?] for publicly known functions
f (x,y) computable as logarithmic-depth circuits. The
group program equivalent of f is computed (using Bar-
rington’s Transform [?]) by both Alice and Bob from the
corresponding circuit. Each of them instantiates their
share of the group program based on their respective in-
put (x for Alice and y for Bob). Then each of them blinds
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Figure 6: Protocol for FKN model, see [?].
their share in coordinated fashion using the shared ran-
domness. Finally, each of Alice and Bob sends their re-
spective blinded shares to Carol who puts them together
to form the final blinded sequence whose value she com-
putes to obtain f (x,y). See Figure 6. What [?] essentially
demonstrate is the construction of a 2-decomposable ran-
domized encoding fˆ of f , as elaborated in Lemma 12.
Of course, the notion of 2-decomposable randomized
encodings arose much later in the work of Ishai and
Kushilevitz [?, ?, ?], but it gives us a convenient language
to think about such protocols. The individual shares,
constructed and, sent to Carol by Alice and Bob are just
the two parts of the 2-decomposable randomized encod-
ing, namely fˆ1(x,r) and fˆ2(y,r). REC guarantees that
Carol is able to learn f (x,y) while SIM guarantees that
he learns nothing beyond that.
Now, we explain the universal circuits bottleneck that
we claim to have overcome. Recall that in our (C-CBPS)
setting f is not just any function but it is a universal
function where f (x,y) = y(x). The term universal comes
from the fact that f is effectively simulating y on x and
so the natural question arises - how efficiently can this
simulation be done? In other words, given that we are
restricted to have only polynomial-size group programs,
what restriction does this put on the class of functions
represented by y? The best known construction of uni-
versal circuits is due to Valiant [?] who shows that if y
were a circuit of size s and depth d then it must satisfy
d logs = O(logn) (for the resulting Barrington Trans-
form to produce a polynomial-length group program).
Observe that this constraint on d and s automatically pre-
vents y from representing circuits in NC1because s ≥ d
and hence d is forced to be o(logn). Sanders, Young
and Yung [?] who utilize Valiant’s universal circuits con-
struction, mention that y could be the class of functions
represented by circuits of depth
√
logn and size 2
√
logn -
note that this is believed to be a strict subset of the class
of predicates in NC1.
Our main contribution is in showing how we can by-
pass the universal circuits bottleneck and instead use
group programs to improve the efficiency of simula-
tion. We present two main constructions. The first,
UGP-Match, which is primarily of theoretical interest,
shows how we can handle all of NC1by encoding the
subscriber’s predicate as a group program (using the Bar-
rington Transform) and constructing a universal group
program using the Barrington Transform (again). This
construction has a conceptually clean proof but it is im-
practical since the double invocation of the Barrington
Transform results in a final group program whose length
is a very high-degree polynomial in n. Our second con-
struction, FSGP-Match, which is potentially practical,
uses a fixed structure trick to avoid one invocation of the
Barrington Transform. Rather than construct a universal
group program using the Barrington Transform we di-
rectly construct a fixed structure group program, which
in essence is a universal group program but much more
economical length-wise. By avoiding the inefficiencies
arising from use of the Barrington Transform we obtain
a final group program whose length is a relatively low-
degree polynomial in n. In this second construction of
FSGP-Match we need a special group program - the se-
lector group program - which we construct by applying
the Barrington Transform to a selector circuit. We also
show how an additional optimization can be achieved by
hand-crafting the the selector group program to obtain
our most efficient construction OFSGP-Match.
4 Protocols and proofs
4.1 UGP-Match
As explained in Section 3 the main idea in the UGP-
Match construction is to use the Barrington Transform to
encode the predicate P (which is representable as a cir-
cuit in NC1) as a polynomial-length group program that
indexes into the metadata bits m. The (publicly known)
circuit f in the protocol for the FKN model [?] (see Fig-
ure 6) is chosen to be such that at the lowest level it first
selects the appropriate group program element based on
the index and value of the corresponding bit in m and
having selected all the group program elements it then
multiplies them together using a standard divide and con-
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quer or balanced binary tree based approach, see Figure
7. In a nutshell, UGP-Match uses the protocol from [?]
for the FKN model, with f being a circuit that takes as
input the metadata m and the predicate P encoded as a
group program and outputs the result of simulating P on
m. We present UGP-Match more formally below. We
refer to the circuit representing f as the UGP-Match Cir-
cuit. We refer to the final group program that the bro-
ker assembles as the Universal Group Program because
it is essentially a Group Program that simulates the group
program representing P.
UGP-Match
1. The publisher and subscriber register with the
broker the precise form of their inputs. In par-
ticular the publisher must specify the number
n of bits of m the meta-data (if there are fewer
relevant bits, the remaining bits can be padded
with dummy bits). And the subscriber speci-
fies L = n2κ the length of the group program
(in terms of number of group element pairs
(not bits) along with the bit of m that each
group element pair is dependent on). As before
the group program can be padded with dummy
pairs if there are fewer relevant pairs. We may
assume that everybody is coordinated on the
choice of the non-solvable group in which to
carry out their computations, say S5, the (sym-
metric) group of permutations on 5 elements,
which itself is a group with 120. For the pur-
pose of this specific cprotocol we can assume
each element is specified in unary using 5 bits
so that any given element of the group is spec-
ified using 5×5 = 25 bits.
2. The broker now computes the UGP-Match Cir-
cuit f (which is essentially a Select block fol-
lowed by a divide-and-conquer Multiply block,
see Figure 7. It then applies the Barrington
Transform to create the corresponding group
program. Each group element pair in this group
program is dependent either on a subscriber bit
or on a publisher bit. The broker hands back
the entire group program to both the publisher
and the subscriber.
3. The publisher and subscriber know which pairs
belong to each of them. They have already
coordinated their pre-shared randomness. De-
pending on the value of their individual bit they
pick the corresponding element of the pair and
1 
UGP 
Multiplier 
Selector 
n n2κ(2*25 + lg n) 
m 
P 
clog n 
5*2κlog n 
log n + loglog n 
O(n20κ+2) 
Barrington Transform 
Barrington Transform 
Figure 7: UGP-Match Circuit
then blind it appropriately. They then give their
respected blinded elements to the broker.
4. The broker puts all the blinded elements to-
gether in the right sequence and multiplies
them. If he gets 1 he forwards along the (en-
crypted) data from the publisher to the sub-
scriber, else he withholds it.
Theorem 20. Given metadata of size at most n and
predicate of depth at most κ lgn, UGP-Match is an
information-theoretically secure protocol for the C-
CBPS model with complexity O˜(n20κ+2.
Proof. The proof that UGP-Match is correct and secure
follows directly from the proof in [?] for the FKN model.
All that remains to do is to bound the complex-
ity of UGP-Match. We now provide a detailed de-
scription of the UGP-Match Circuit f . See Figure
7. This circuit takes in as input m and the bit-
representation of the group program obtained from ap-
plying the Barrington Transform (see Theorem 8) to P.
The group program is a sequence of L = n2κ group pro-
gram elements each of which is two group elements
and an index (into m. We represent the group ele-
ments which are permutations of S5 in unary, e.g., we
would represent the permutation (23451) as the bit se-
quence 00010 00100 01000 10000 00001 (the spacings
are placed for convenience of reading). We note that this
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is not the most economical representation in terms of bit-
length but what we are ultimately looking to minimize is
the length of the final group program, i.e. the depth of
the UGP-Match Circuit and for that purpose this repre-
sentation is close to optimal. Each of the indices in bi-
nary is represented using lgn bits. The UGP-Match Cir-
cuit is a Select block followed by a divide-and-conquer
Multiply block. In the Select block, corresponding to
each group program index the value of the bit of m is
extracted using a mux (multiplexer, see [?]) which is a
circuit of depth lgn+ lg lgn. The corresponding group
program element is then selected using a circuit of depth
2. Multiplying two group program elements takes a cir-
cuit of depth 5 and hence the Multiply block has depth
(5×2κ) lgn (recall that the group program P has length
n2κ ). Thus the total depth of the UGP-Match Circuit
is (10κ + 1) lgn + lg lgn + 2. The Barrington Trans-
form (see Theorem 8 of UGP-Match Circuit gives us
a final group program under the FKN model of length
O˜(n20κ+2).
Corollary 21. UGP-Match is an efficient and secure
protocol for matching any predicate in NC1.
4.2 Fixed Structure Group Programs
We now state and prove the key lemma concerning fixed
structure group programs.
Lemma 22 (Fixed structure programs yield 2-de-
composable randomized encodings of universal func-
tions). Fixed structure programs are convertible to 2-
decomposable randomized encodings of universal func-
tions with no loss of efficiency.
Proof. The conversion of a fixed structure program to
a 2-decomposable randomized encodings of universal
functions is fairly straightforward involving instantiation
and coordinated blinding.
Consider a class of predicates P convertible to
fixed structure group programs. Let (g1,g2, . . . ,gL+1),
(k1,k2, . . . ,kL) be the fixed structure group program, i.e.,
a (α,1)-preserving group program with a fixed index se-
quence (the index sequence is the same independent of
the specific function that the group program is computing
though the interstitial group elements (g1,g2, . . . ,gL+1)
would depend on the specific function). We now need to
demonstrate two functions fˆ1(m,r) and fˆ2(P,r) satisfy-
ing the requirements of Definition 10, with the additional
constraint of universality, namely that f (m,P) =P(m).
Given a specific instance of metadata m the function
fˆ1 first selects α or 1 as appropriate for each of the in-
dex sequence pairs; note that this is done independent of
the specific predicate P. Then fˆ1 blinds the resulting se-
quence using the randomness r. Similarly, depending on
the specific predicate P fˆ2 converts to the fixed structure
group program and gets a specific instantiation of the in-
terstitial group elements (g1,g2, . . . ,gL+1). Then this se-
quence is blinded by fˆ2 using r. Observe that the fixed
structure is crucial for the construction of fˆ1 so that it is
independent of P. u
It remains to prove Correctness and Security as per
Definition 10. First, the existence of REC and Correct-
ness follows because of the appropriate cancelation of
the blinders and so P(m) can be recovered exactly from
multiplying the elements of the final assembled group
program. Next, the existence of SIM and Security - ob-
serve that independent of the specific instance the bro-
ker receives shares of the same form from both pub-
lisher and subscriber and by Lemma 5 (Blinding Lemma)
these shares are uniformly distributed over all possible
sequences with same final value and therefore SIM can
generate the outputs with the same distribution as fˆ1 and
fˆ2 by generating all but one element of the sequence
completely and uniformly at random, then generating the
last element so that the value of the sequence is the given
final value, and then splitting the group program into the
two parts corresponding to fˆ1 and fˆ2.
Observe that an implication of the above Lemma is
that the fixed structure of the group program implicitly
encodes a universal function.
The below corollary follows from the two lemmas,
Lemma 22 and 15, since 2-decomposable randomized
encodings of universal functions are isomorphic to pro-
tocols for the C-CBPS model.
Corollary 23. Fixed structure programs yield secure C-
CBPS protocols with no loss of efficiency.
4.3 FSGP-Match
With Lemma 22 and Corollary 23 in hand, all we need
to do is to demonstrate a fixed structure group program
of the right complexity. We give an intuitive description
of the main idea. Applying the (α,1)-preserving Bar-
rington Transform to the predicate P yields an (α,1)-
preserving group program but not a fixed structure group
program because the index sequence would vary depend-
ing on the predicate P. So, then we substitute each in-
stance of a group program pair in this group program
by a fixed (α,1)-preserving group program block we
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Figure 8: Fixed Selector Circuit
call the Fixed Selector Group Program. This creates a
fixed structure. And by padding appropriately we can
fix the length to be independent of the inputs as well. It
remains to describe the Fixed Selector Group Program.
The Fixed Selector Group Program is obtained by ap-
plying an (α,1)-preserving Barrington Transform to the
Fixed Selector Circuit. Figure 8 is a visual description
of the Fixed Selector Circuit. The Fixed Selector Circuit
is an OR of ANDs. It has one AND gate for each bit
of the metadata m as input. The other input to the AND
gate is a “new” bit under the control of the subscriber.
Since the subscriber knows the predicate P it knows ex-
actly which bit of the input (m) it needs in that particu-
lar block (based on the index of the group program pair
that the block is replacing). Once the subscriber instan-
tiates these bits approrpriately and blinds then the Fixed
Selector Group Program is just a block with a fixed in-
dex sequence since all the dependence on the predicate
P is factored into the interstitial group elements. Thus
the overall index sequence is fixed. Note that for blocks
in the padding the subscriber can set all new bits to 0
thus effectively reducing the padding part of the group
program to a no-op, something that evaluates to 1.
FSGP-Match
1. The publisher and subscriber register with the
broker the precise form of their inputs. In par-
ticular the publisher must specify the number
n of bits of m the meta-data (if there are fewer
relevant bits, the remaining bits can be padded
with dummy bits). And the subscriber specifies
D = 2κ lgn the maximal depth of the predicate
P.
2. The broker now comutes the form of the
fixed structure group program by applying the
(α,1)-preserving Barrington Transform to any
circuit of depth D to create the corresponding
(α,1)-preserving group program. Again, only
the form of the group program is relevant at
this stage, not the values of the specific in-
terstitial group elements or indices in the in-
dex sequence. It then replaces each group pro-
gram pair with the Fixed Selector Group Pro-
gram and returns the entire composite group
program back to the publisher and subscriber.
At this point the values of the interstitial group
elements do not matter but the index sequence,
which is fixed, does matter. The program is an
α,1)-preserving group program with indices
that index into the metadata bits.
3. The publisher selects one of α or 1 depend-
ing on the value of the corresponding metadata
bit for each group program pair, blinds them
and sends back to the broker. The subscriber,
applies the (α,1)-preserving Barrington Trans-
form to the specific instance P to get the con-
crete values for the interstitial group elements,
appropriately sets the “new” bits for the Fixed
Selector Group Program blocks, and blinds the
entire sequence and sends to the broker.
4. The broker puts all the blinded elements to-
gether in the right sequence and multiplies
them. If he gets 1 he forwards along the (en-
crypted) data from the publisher to the sub-
scriber, else he withholds it.
Theorem 24. Given metadata of size at most n and
predicate of depth at most κ lgn, FSGP-Match is an
information-theoretically secure protocol for the C-
CBPS model with complexity 4n2κ+2.
Proof. FSGP-Match is obtained by applying the (α,1)-
preserving Barrington Transform to the predicate P to
yield an (α,1)-preserving group program where each in-
stance of a group program pair is substituted by the Fixed
Selector Group Program. It is clear that FSGP-Match
produces a fixed structure group program and hence it
follows from Lemma 22 that it is correct and secure.
All that remains to do is to bound the complexity of
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Figure 9: (Hand) Optimized Fixed Selector Group Pro-
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FSGP-Match. Recall that group program pair in the
group program (of length n2κ is substituted by the Fixed
Selector Group Program. The Fixed Selector Group cir-
cuit (see Figure 8) has depth 1+ lgn and hence the re-
sulting Fixed Selector Group Program has length 4n2
which means that the final group program has a length
4n2×n2κ = 4n2κ+2.
4.4 OFSGP-Match
OFSGP-Match is basically FSGP-Match with the addi-
tional innovation being that we use an Optimized Fixed
Selector Group Program. See Figure 9.
Theorem 25. Given metadata of size at most n and
predicate of depth at most κ lgn, OFSGP-Match is
an information-theoretically secure protocol for the C-
CBPS model with complexity 2n2κ+1.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 24
so we do not repeat it.
The Optimized Fixed Selector Group Program (see
Fig. 9) has length 2n which means that the final group
program has a length 2n×n2κ = 2n2κ+1.
5 Implementation and Performance
We implemented all three of our protocols in Java. We
will spare the reader the details of the code. As has
already been explained the protocols are conceptually
straightforward. The only protocol that was somewhat
performant was OFSGP-Match. In particular, we con-
sidered the Hamming problem as that is representative
of a typical function in the context of publish/subscribe.
The publisher and the subscriber each have a private bit-
vector of n bits. They wish to compute a secure Ham-
ming match, i.e., given a common threshold level (be-
tween 0 and log2 n) they wish to exchange the actual
content iff the Hamming distance between their respec-
tive vectors exceeds the threshold. The bottleneck from
a computational standpoint is the cost of computing a
match at the broker, which is basically the length of the
resulting group program. Since, in our setting the sub-
scribers submit predicates, we have our subscriber sub-
mit the Hamming distance circuit with its own bit-vector
and the threshold hard-coded into it.
Our match algorithm implemented as a circuit, essen-
tially, involved computing the difference vector of the
two vectors, then sorting the bits using a Bose-Nelson
sorting network [?], and outputting the threshold bit
as the match. We used a Bose-Nelson circuit because
they have the shortest depth (i.e. best constants) for
small depths (even though AKS sorting networks [?]
are asymptotically optimal - depth O(logn) - instead of
O(
√
(n)) for Bose-Nelson). We implemented the above
match algorithm on a 3GHz quad-core i7 laptop. Our
goal was to find the largest n for which the match could
be computed under 1s. The results are presented in Table
2 in Appendix B. Here n is the length of the bit-vectors.
d is the depth of the resulting ciruit and the final col-
umn shows the length of the resulting OFSGP-Match se-
quence. The main takeaway is that even our best scheme
becomes unusable for a relative simple function such as
the Hamming distance once the bit vectors get to over 16
bits in length.
6 Conclusion
We started out on a research plan to achieve secure pub-
lish/subscribe at line speeds. Though we did not reach
our goal this paper reports on the substantial progress
we achieved - namely information-theoretically secure
publish/subscribe for predicated in NC1. On the the-
oretical front we achieved a level of expressivity that
had not been previously attained and on the practical
front we made a substantial advance towards a practical
scheme. Our protocols have the benefit of being concep-
tually clean and simple, so simple that we can capture
their complexity without even employing the big-Oh no-
tation, see Table 1 . Going forward, the main open ques-
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tion is to come up with a much faster protocol, poten-
tially one that will scale at wireline speeds (Gbps).
A Barrington Transform
A.1 Barrington Transform
We present the proof of Theorem 8 based on the treat-
ment in [?]. (Note that the statement of the theorem
is true for any cycle α and not just the specific cycle
(23451).
Proof. We present the proof as a series of lemmas.
Lemma 26 (The cycle does not matter). Let α,β ∈ S5
be two cycles, let f : {0,1}n → {0,1}. Then f is α-
computable with length ` ⇔ f is β -computable with
length `.
Proof. First observe that ∃ραβ ∈ S5 such that α =
ρ−1αββραβ .
To see this let
α = (α1,α2, ...,α5)cycle
β = (β1,β2, ...,β5)cycle
ραβ := (α1→ β1,α2→ β2, ...,α5→ β5).
(With α = (23451) and β = (35421) we get ραβ =
(13425),ρ−1αβ = (14235).
Suppose that (g01, ...,g
0
`)(g
1
1, ...,g
1
l )(k1, ...k`)
β -computes f ; we claim that
(ρ−1αβg
0
1, ...,g
0
`ραβ )(ρ
−1
αβg
1
1, ...,g
1
`ραβ ) (with the same
indices ki) α-computes f . To see this, note that
`
∏
i=1
g
xki
i = 1G⇒ ρ−1αβ
l
∏
i=1
g
xki
i ρ = ρ
−1 ·ραβ = 1,
`
∏
i=1
g
xki
i = β ⇒ ρ−1αβ
l
∏
i=1
gxkii ρ = ρ
−1βραβ = α.
Lemma 27 ( f ⇒ 1− f ). If f : {0,1}n → {0,1} is α-
computable by a group program of length `, so is 1− f .
Proof. First apply the previous lemma to α−1-compute
f . Then multiply last group elements g0` and g
1
` in the
group program by α . (Note that α−1 = (51234).)
Lemma 28 ( f ,g⇒ f ∧ g). If f is α-computable with
length ` and g is β computable with length ` then ( f ∧g)
is (αβα−1β−1)-computable with length 4`.
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Proof. Concatenate 4 programs: (α-computes f , β -
computes g, α−1-computes f , β−1-computes g).
(f(x)=1)∧ (g(x)=1)⇒ concatenated program evaluates to
(αβα−1β−1); but if either f (x) = 0 or g(x) = 0 then the
concatenated program evaluates to 0. For example, if
f (x) = 0 and g(x) = 1 then the concatenated program
gives 1 ·β ·1 ·β−1 = 1.
It only remains to see that we can apply the previous
lemma while still computing with respect to a cycle.
Lemma 29. ∃α,β cycles such that αβα−1β−1 is a cy-
cle.
Proof. Let α := (23451), β := (35421), we can check
αβα−1β−1 = γ = (35214) is a cycle.
The proof of the theorem follows by induction on d
using previous lemmas.
A.2 (α,1)-preserving Barrington Trans-
form
The proof of Theorem 18 is basically the same as the
proof of Theorem 8 with minor modifications to account
for the fact that we are now transforming the circuit into
an (α,1)-preserving group program.
Proof. As before we present the proof as a series of lem-
mas.
Lemma 30 (The cycle does not matter). Let α,β ∈ S5
be two cycles, let f : {0,1}n → {0,1}. Then f is α-
computable with length ` ⇔ f is β -computable with
length `.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 26.
Let α,βραβ ∈ S5 be as in that lemma. Sup-
pose that (g1,g2, . . . ,gL+1) (k1,k2, . . . ,kL) β -computes
f then it follows, in straightforward fashion that
(ρ−1αβg1,g2, . . . ,gL+1ραβ ) (k1,k2, . . . ,kL) α-computes f .
Lemma 31 ( f ⇒ 1− f ). If f : {0,1}n → {0,1} is α-
computable by a group program of length `, so is 1− f .
Proof. First apply the previous lemma to α−1-compute
f . Then multiply the last group elements gL group pro-
gram by α .
Lemma 32 ( f ,g⇒ f ∧ g). If f is α-computable with
length ` and g is β computable with length ` then ( f ∧g)
is (αβα−1β−1)-computable with length 4`.
Proof. The proof of this Lemma is identical to the proof
of Lemma 28.
The proof of the theorem follows by induction on d
using previous lemmas. and Lemma 29.
15
B Hamming distance - Performance
n - bit-vector length d - circuit depth OFSGP-Match - sequence length
2 5 4096
3 8 393216
4 8 524288
5 12 1.68∗108
6 12 2.01∗108
7 13 9.4∗108
8 13 1.07∗109
9 16 7.73∗1010
10 16 8.59∗1010
11 16 9.45∗1010
12 16 1.03∗1011
13 16 1.12∗1011
14 16 1.2∗1011
15 16 1.29∗1011
16 16 1.37∗1011
Table 2: Length of group program for computing Ham-
ming distance.
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